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Abstract
The advent of "smart meters" will make possible Real Time Pricing of electricity: customers
will face and react to wholesale spot prices, thus consumption of electric power will be aligned
with its opportunity cost. This article determines the marginal value of a fraction of demand (or
a consumer) switching to Real Time Pricing. First, it derives this marginal value for a simple yet
realistic specication of demand. Second, using data from the French power market, it estimates
that, for the vast majority of residential customers whose peak demand is lower than 6 kV A, the
net surplus from switching to Real Time Pricing is lower than 1 e/year for low demand elasticity,
4 e/year for high demand elasticity. This nding casts a doubt on the economic value of rolling
out smart meters to all residential customers, for both policy makers and power suppliers.
Keywords: electric power markets, demand response, smart grid
JEL Classi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1 Introduction
"Smart meters", which allow electric power users to respond to wholesale spot prices, are expected to
transform the electric power industry. Consumers will reduce their consumption during peak hours,
thus reducing installed capacity requirement and emissions of CO2 and other pollutants. The potential
value of these demand management benets is signicant. For example, Faruqui et al. (2009), estimate
the annual potential value for all of Europe of reduced capacity cost at e 4:8 billions, and the value
from reduced electricity consumption at e 600 millions. Similarly, the Department of Energy and
Climate Change (DECC) estimates the Present Value for Britain of energy savings benets at $ 4
400 millions, carbon savings at £ 1 100 millions, and peak load shifting at £ 800 millions. As a result,
full deployment of "smart meters" is underway in many European countries and US states.
The policy discussion of smart meters appears to be framed as a one-or-zero problem: should we
install meters for all users or for none? This is surprising. As all economic problems, it should be
cast as an optimal share of deployment problem: which consumer groups should be equipped with
smart meters? To answer that question, one should compare the marginal value of equipping a class
of consumers against its marginal cost. A key ingredient in the analysis is the marginal value of Real
Time Pricing (RTP ), i.e., the marginal surplus generated by one customer becoming price responsive.
This is precisely what this article estimates.
This article builds on and complements a rich literature. Reiss and White (2005) and Allcott
(2011) estimate individual price elasticity of customers, and use these elasticities to estimate welfare
e¤ects. Reiss and White (2005), using data from California households, focus on the non-linearity of
the pricing schedule and estimate demand for eight di¤erent types of electric appliances, e.g., electric
space heating, room air conditioning, etc. They then estimate the welfare impact of a rate structure
change proposed in California. Allcott (2011) estimates the demand function from consumers opting
for Real Time Pricing in a pilot program in Chicago. He then estimates the annualized short term
consumer surplus increase from RTP , assuming wholesale prices and producers prots are constant,
at $10 per household.
Holland and Mansur (2006), Borenstein (2005), Borenstein and Holland (2005), and Allcott (2012)
use existing estimates of price elasticity to estimate the welfare impact of RTP . Holland and Mansur
(2006) estimate the short-term welfare impact of exposing 33%, 67%, and 100% of demand to RTP
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in the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland market (PJM), a large power market in the North East of
the United States. The estimated gross welfare gain if 100% of load is exposed to RTP is 0:24% of
the total energy bill. Borenstein (2005) estimates the long-term welfare impact, including adjustment
to the generation mix, of exposing 33%, 66%, and 99% of demand to RTP in the California market.
For example if 33% of demand faces RTP , the estimated gross welfare gain ranges from 1:2% of the
total energy bill for low elasticity to 7% for high elasticity. Allcott (2012) estimates the long-term
welfare impact of moving 20% of demand to RTP in PJM , taking into account the impact of demand
elasticity on producersmarket power. He nds a gross welfare increase (excluding infrastructure cost)
of 38:90 $ per kW of average demand equipped with smart meters.
This article follows a di¤erent approach, that proposes a closed form expression for the marginal
value of RTP , then estimates it using the load duration curve of the French power system1 and
previous estimates of demand elasticity. Its contribution is twofold. First, it proposes an analytically
tractable approximation of the solution to the optimal investment problem for a power system. The
general principles of peak-load pricing have been developed in the late 1940s (Boiteux (1949)), and
revisited recently (e.g., Borenstein and Holland (2005), Joskow and Tirole (2007)). However, the
approximation developed here is the only one I am aware of that provides (almost) closed form solutions
to the problem, while closely matching real data. This approximation may be used to examine other
issues pertaining to power markets, but also more general issues of sizing and pricing of facilities when
demand is uncertain and multiple technologies are available (e.g., infrastructure, cloud computing,
etc.)
This articles second contribution is an estimate of the marginal increase in net surplus of a
customer switching to RTP . Using the load duration curve of the French power system and previous
estimates of demand elasticity, this value is estimated at 1 to 4 e/customer per year for a small
residential customer, whose peak demand is lower than 6 kV A. As a comparison point, this value
is far below the cost of installing smart meters for small customers (residential and non residential),
currently estimated around 25e/meter per year.
This article is structured as follows. The model used in this article is the one developed by
Borenstein and Holland (2005) and Joskow and Tirole (2007), building on the earlier work by Boiteux
1The structure of the French power industry, namely EDFs dominant position, is not relevant for this analysis.
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(1949). For convenience, Section 2 summarizes its main features and results. The reader familiar with
the model can proceed to Section 3, that presents general results on the impact of a marginal switch
to RTP . Section 4 then presents the approximation leading to the closed form solution, and the main
analytical results. Section 5 discusses the development of numerical simulations for the French market,
and presents the main empirical results. Section 6 concludes, that proposes avenues of future work.
Technical proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
2 The model
2.1 Model structure
2.1.1 Uncertainty
Uncertainty is an essential feature of power markets. In this work, only demand uncertainty is explicitly
modeled, since including production uncertainty does not modify the economic insights, although, as
discussed in Section 6, it raises the value of RTP . The number of possible states of the world is
innite, and these are indexed by t 2 [0;+1). f (t) and F (t) are respectively the ex ante probability
and cumulative density functions of state t.
2.1.2 Demand, supply, and rationing
Demand
Assumption 1 Customers have the same load prole: in state t, all have the same underlying demand
D (p; t) up to a scaling factor. D (p; t) is non increasing in price, and states of the world are ordered
such that D (p; t) is increasing in the state of the world:
@D
@p
(p; t)  0 and @D
@t
(p; t) > 0:
Assumption 1 greatly simplies the derivations, while preserving the main economics insights.
Inverse demand is P (q; t) is dened by D (P (q; t) ; t) = q, and gross consumers surplus is S (p; t) =R D(p;t)
0 P (q; t) dq.
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Customers are split in two categories: a fraction  of consumers faces and react to wholesale
spot price ("price reactive" consumers), and a fraction (1  ) of consumers faces a constant two-part
pricing scheme ("constant price" consumers), with price pR per MWh, constant across all states of
the world, and connection charge A per year.
Since all consumers have the same load prole up to a scaling factor by Assumption 1,  is constant
across states of the world.
Supply Di¤erent generation technologies are available, indexed by n. cn is the marginal cost, and rn
is the hourly investment cost (i.e., annual investment cost expressed in e=MW=year divided by 8760
hours per year) of technology n, both expressed in e=MWh. Generation technologies are ordered by
increasing marginal cost: cn > cm 8 n  m. There is a trade-o¤ between investment and marginal
costs: if a technology produces at higher variable cost, it then requires lower investment cost, i.e.,
rn < rm 8 n  m.
Not all available technologies are included in the optimal investment plan. To simplify the expo-
sition, I propose later necessary and su¢ cient conditions for technologies 1 to N to be used at the
optimum.
Rationing and Value of Lost Load In some states of the world, it may be optimal to curtail
constant price customers. Denote  2 [0; 1] the serving ratio:  = 0 means full curtailment, while
 = 1 means no curtailment.
For state t, D (p; ; t) is the demand for price p and serving ratio , and P (q; ; t) is the in-
verse demand for a given serving ratio ; dened by D (P (q; ; t) ; ; t) = q. Then S (p; ; t) =R D(p;;t)
0 P (q; ; t) dq is the gross consumer surplus. We verify that: @S(D(p;;t);;t)@p = p@D@p .
Any rationing technology satises: (i) D (p; 0; t) = 0, (ii) @D@ > 0 for  2 [0; 1], and (iii) S (p; t) 
S (p; 1; t) and D (p; t)  D (p; 1; t).
The Value of Lost Load (V oLL) represents the value consumers would place on an extra unit of
non delivered electricity. Formally, it is dened as
v (p; ; t) =
@S
@
@D
@
(p; ; t) :
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Assumption 2 1. The SO has the technical ability to curtail "constant price" customers while not
curtailing "price reactive" customers.
2. Rationing does not increase the net surplus: 8p > 0;8t  0;8 > 0
S (p; ; t)  pD (p; ; t)  S (p; t)  pD (p; t) :
3. If the serving ratio is positive, the Value of Lost Load is always higher than the price of power,
i.e., 8p > 0;8t  0;8 > 0 we have:
v (p; ; t) > p:
The rst part of Assumption 2 is unrealistic today, as the SO can only organize curtailment by
zone, and cannot di¤erentiate by type of customer. However, it will be met when "smart meters" are
being rolled out, which is precisely the situation considered.
Parts 2 and 3 of Assumption 2 hold for example if rationing is anticipated, which yields S (p; ) =
S (p), and proportional, which yields D (p; ) = D (p). Thus, (i)
S (p; ; t)  pD (p; ; t) =  (S (p; t)  pD (p; t))  S (p; t)  pD (p; t)
for   1; and (ii) v (p; ; t) = S(p)D(p) > p.
Parts 2 and 3 of Assumption 2 should hold for all possible rationing technologies: rationing does
not increase net surplus, and consumers are always willing to pay at least as much for a MWh when
curtailment is possible as they are for a MWh in normal circumstances.
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2.2 Optimal dispatch and investment
2.2.1 First-order conditions, production, and consumption
Under Assumption 1 to 3, Joskow and Tirole (2007) show that it is never optimal to curtail "price
reactive" customers. The total consumer surplus and demand in state t are therefore:
8><>:
~S
 
p; pR; ; ; t

= S (p; t) + (1  )S  pR; ; t
~D
 
p; pR; ; ; t

= D (p; t) + (1  )D  pR; ; t
The net surplus from consumption is then:
W h () =
8>>><>>>:
max
p(:);pR;(:);un(:);kn
E
"
~S
 
p (t) ; pR;  (t) ; ; t
  P
n1
cnun (t) kn
#
  P
n1
rnkn
st : 8t  0 ~D
 
p (t) ; pR;  (t) ; ; t
  P
n1
un (t) kn ( (t))
where p (t) is the price faced by price reactive customers,  (t) 2 [0; 1] the serving ratio, un (t) 2 [0; 1]
the dispatch ratio of technology n,  (t)  0 the Lagrange multiplier in state t, pR the retail price,
kn  0 the installed capacity of technology n. W h () is the net expected surplus per hour. The yearly
surplus is W () = 8760W h () since there are 8 760 hours per year.
The Lagrangian is:
L = E
24 ~S  X
n1
cnun (t) kn +  (t)
24X
n1
un (t) kn   ~D
3535 X
n1
rnkn
and the rst-order derivatives are:
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
@L
@p(t) =  (p (t)   (t))Dp
@L
@un(t)
= ( (t)  cn) kn
@L
@(t) = (1  ) (v (t)   (t))D
@L
@pR
= (1  )E  pR    (t)Dp
@L
@kn
= E ([ (t)  cn]un (t))  rn
The rst-order conditions yield familiar results (see for example Borenstein and Holland (2005)
and Joskow and Tirole (2007), who also discuss su¢ cient conditions for the program to be concave).
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First, @L@p(t) = 0 yields p (t) =  (t): price reactive customers pay the opportunity cost of electricity
in each state.
Second, @L@un(t) yields the dispatch rule:
un (t) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1 if cn < p (t)
0 if cn > p (t)
~D Pm<n km
kn
if cn = p (t)
Technology n produces at capacity (resp. does not produce) if its marginal cost is lower than the price
(resp. exceeds the price) in state t. If technology n is marginal, i.e., price setting, energy balance sets
the dispatch ratio. p (t) =  (t) > 0 is therefore wholesale spot power price.
Third, @L@(t) yields the rationing rule:
 (t) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1 if v (t) > p (t)
0 if v (t) < p (t)
~D Pm<n km
kn
if v (t) = p (t)
Rationing occurs if only if the V oLL is lower than the real time price.
Fourth, @L
@pR
= 0 yields:
pR =
E [p (t)Dp]
E [Dp]
As in Joskow and Tirole (2007), the optimal retail price is the weighted average wholesale price, where
the weights are the marginal "rationed demand". The optimal retail price needs not cover the full
production cost. The xed part of two part retail price balances the retailersprots.
Finally, @L@kn = 0 yields:
E [(p (t)  cn)un (t)] = rn
The optimal capacity is such that the marginal prot when the plant operates equals the investment
(or capacity) cost.
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2.2.2 Investment plan
If the program is concave (which we assume here), the rst-order conditions determine a unique
optimum. Denote Kn =
Pn
m=1 km the total installed capacity up to and including technology n, tn
(resp. tn) the rst state of the world where technology n is dispatched (resp. is at capacity). Adopt
the convention tN+1 ! +1.
From the previous rst order conditions, price equals the marginal cost of technology n when this
one is marginal, but not yet constrained. When technology n is at capacity, but technology (n+ 1) is
not yet dispatched, the energy balance determines the price:
D (p; t) + (1  )D  pR; ; t = Kn:
Hence, for n 2 f1; :::; ; Ng,
p (t) =
8><>:
cn for t 2 [tn; tn]
 (Kn; t) = P

Kn (1 )D(pR;;t)


for t 2 [tn; tn+1]
where  is the optimal serving ratio.
Denote bt (K; c) the rst state of the world such that   K;bt (K; c)  c. By construction, we have:
8><>:  (Kn;
tn) = cn , tn = bt (Kn; cn)
 (Kn; tn+1) = cn+1 , tn+1 = bt (Kn; cn+1) :
The structure of these critical states of the world and prices is illustrated on Figure 1.
Dene
	(K; c) =
Z +1
bt(K;c) (p (t)  c) f (t) dt;
the marginal social value of capacity K for marginal cost c. Since p (t) is increasing, we have: un(t) 
0 8 t  tn and un(t) = 1 8 t  tn. The rst-order condition determining Kn then becomes:
	(Kn; cn) =
Z +1
bt(Kn;cn) (p (t)  cn) f (t) dt = rn: (1)
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Equation (1) for n = N yields:
	(KN ; cN ) = rN (2)
The total installed capacity is solely determined by the long-run marginal cost of the last technology
and the demand function.
Then, for 1  n < N , equation (1) yields:
rn =
Z bt(Kn;cn+1)
bt(Kn;cn) (p (t)  cn) f (t) dt+
Z bt(Kn+1;cn+1)
bt(Kn;cn+1) (cn+1   cn) f (t) dt
+
Z +1
bt(Kn+1;cn+1) (p (t)  cn+1 + cn+1   cn) f (t) dt
,
rn =
Z bt(Kn;cn+1)
bt(Kn;cn) ( (Kn; t)  cn) f (t) dt+
Z +1
bt(Kn;cn+1) (cn+1   cn) f (t) dt+	(Kn+1; cn+1)
, Z bt(Kn;cn+1)
bt(Kn;cn) ( (Kn; t)  cn) f (t) dt+
Z +1
bt(Kn;cn+1) (cn+1   cn) f (t) dt = rn   rn+1: (3)
A marginal substitution of technology (n+ 1) by technology n increases net surplus by ( (Kn; t)  cn)
for t 2 bt (Kn; cn) ;bt (Kn; cn+1) and by (cn+1   cn) for t  bt (Kn; cn+1). It also increases investment
cost by (rn   rn+1). The optimal capacity Kn exactly balances marginal benet and marginal cost.
I have sofar assumed existence of the optimal cumulative capacities 0 < K1 < ::: < KN . I present
below a set of necessary and su¢ cient conditions. First,
 (0; 0) > cN
guarantees that bt (0; cn) = 0 for all n, hence simplies the exposition. Second, 	(0; cN ) > rN is
necessary and su¢ cient for the existence of KN > 0 solution of equation (2). Since bt (0; cN ) = 0,
	(0; cN ) =
Z +1
0
[ (0; t)  cN ] f (t) dt = E [ (0; t)]  cN :
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Thus, 	(0; cN ) > rN is equivalent to
E [ (0; t)] > cN + rN :
Third, for n = 1; :::; N   1, 	(0; cn) > rn is necessary and su¢ cient for existence of Kn > 0 solution
of equation (3). Since
	(0; cn) =
Z +1
0
[cn+1   cn] f (t) dt+ rn+1 = cn+1   cn + rn+1;
	(0; cn) > rn is equivalent to
cn+1 + rn+1 > cn + rn:
Finally, for n = 1; :::; N   1, Kn < Kn+1 is necessary and su¢ cient for technology (n+ 1) to be
included in the investment plan. Since 	 is decreasing in its rst argument, this is equivalent to
	(Kn+1; cn) < rn:
These conditions are assumed to hold in Sections 3 and 4. They are veried by the numerical
example proposed in Section 5.
3 Increasing the proportion of price reactive customers
This section examines the long-term impact of a marginal increase in : as in Borenstein (2005) and
Allcott (2012), all values, in particular, generation capacity and mix and retail prices, are optimal.
One could challenge this choice as being unrealistic, since installed generation mix and retail prices
are rarely optimal. However, I believe this is the appropriate analysis, as it isolates the impact of
switching to RTP .
3.1 Impact on welfare
Result 1 Increasing the proportion of price-reactive customers always increases the net surplus from
consumption.
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P roof. The envelope theorem yields:
dW h
d
=
@W h
@
= E

(S (p (t) ; t)  p (t)D (p (t) ; t))   S  pR;  (t) ; t  p (t)D  pR;  (t) ; t :
S  pR;  (t) ; t  p (t)D  pR;  (t) ; t  S  pR; t  p (t)D  pR; t
since rationing does not generate value; and
S
 
pR; t
  p (t)D  pR; t  S (p (t) ; t)  p (t)D (p (t) ; t)
since p = argmaxx fS (x; t)  pD (x; t)g. Thus,
dW h
d
 E (S (p (t) ; t)  p (t)D (p (t) ; t))   S  pR; t  p (t)D  pR; t  0:
Price reactive customers are not rationed, and consume in each state according to the state-
contingent price and not a xed price (even optimally chosen). Increasing their share thus always
increases the net surplus. Result 1 di¤ers from Borenstein and Holland (2005), who propose a counter-
example, where increasing the share of price-reactive consumers reduces overall welfare. However,
Borenstein and Holland (2005) assume that the retail price is such that the retail prot is equal to
zero. In this work, following Joskow and Tirole (2007), we consider that retailersbudget balance can
be achieved by a two-part tari¤. In that case, the variable part of the retail price is chosen optimally,
and the envelope theorem applies.
Result 1 matters for methodological reasons. Numerous analyses (e.g., Faruqui et al. (2009))
consider all demand reduction as a benet. Result 1 shows this is incorrect, as one should also include
the (lost) value of the foregone consumption in the analysis. In other words, welfare is measured with
triangles, and not rectangles. This is illustrated on Figure 2.
3.2 Impact on average price
Result 2 Increasing the share of price reactive customers has no impact on the expected price.
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P roof. By construction, we have: t1 = 0. Equation (1) for n = 1 then yields:
E [(p (t)  c1)]tt1 = r1
,
E [p (t)]tt1 = r1 + c1 Pr (t  t1) :
Then,
E [p (t)] = c1 Pr (t  t1) + E [p (t)]tt1 = r1 + c1;
hence
dE [p (t)]
d
= 0:
Since the rst technology (the baseload technology) produces in all states of the world, the zero-
prot condition implies that the expected spot price is simply the long run marginal cost of the
baseload technology, i.e., the sum of its marginal and capacity cost. It is therefore independent of
the share of price sensitive customers. This contradicts commonly held wisdom that real time pricing
lowers time weighted average power price.
3.3 A specic case: linear demand, no rationing at the optimum
Suppose demand is linear and is given by:
P (q; t) = a (t)  bq:
Suppose also that no rationing occurs at the optimum. As will be shown in Section 5, this
assumption holds as soon as a small fraction of customers face real time prices, i.e.,  larger than a
small threshold.
Result 3 If demand is linear and rationing does not occur at the optimum, the marginal net surplus
is proportional to the spot price volatility.
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P roof. Since demand is linear D (p; t) = a(t) pb , then
S (p; t) =
Z D(p;t)
0
(a (t)  bq) dq =

a (t)  b
2
D (p; t)

D (p; t)
=

a (t) + p
2

D (p; t) :
The net surplus is
S (p; t)  pD (p; t) = S (p; t)  pD (p; t)
=

a (t)  p
2

D (p; t) =
b
2
D2 (p; t) :
Since there is no rationing at the optimum, we have: Dp = Dp =  1b hence
pR = E [ (t)] = c1 + r1:
Thus,
S  pR; 1; t  pD  pR; 1; t = S  pR; t  pD  pR; t
=
 
a (t)  bD
 
pR; t

2
  (a (t)  bD (p; t))
!
D
 
pR; t

=
b
2
 
2D (p; t) D  pR; tD  pR; t :
Then:
W h0 () =
b
2
E

D2 (p; t)   2D (p; t) D  pR; tD  pR; t
=
b
2
E
h 
D (p (t) ; t) D  pR; t2i
=
1
2b
E
h 
pR   p (t)2i = 1
2b
V ar (p (t)) :
If demand is linear, the marginal surplus is a exactly a triangle. The surface of the triangle can
be expressed as the square of one of its side times the slope of the opposite angle. This then produces
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the result.
V ar (p (t)) does not depend on the average price, therefore transmission and distribution rates,
which are constant across time, do not matter. This can also be understood by observing that these
constant costs are included in the constant term a.
4 A closed form solution
A closed form solution is available if we assume that (i) demand is linear, with a (t) = a0   a1e 2t
and f (t) = 1e 1t, and (ii) rationing is anticipated and proportional. As will be shown in Section 5,
for an optimal choice of the parameters (a0; a1; 1; 2), this specication is consistent with observed
load duration curves and estimated price elasticities, while leading to simple expressions for the values
of interest. Richer specications will be tested in further work. However, initial tests suggest that the
results hold for changes in the parameters, hence the results are likely to be robust.
4.1 Optimal investment
Dene
y (K; c; ) = a1e
 2bt(K;c) = a0   bK    c+ (1  ) pR :
Result 4 Suppose rationing does not occur at the optimum. If
a1   (1 + ) r
where  = 12 , the optimal total capacity KN is the solution of:
y (KN ; cN ; )
1+ = a1 (1 + ) rN : (4)
For n = 1; :::; N   1, if
a1
 
1 

1   (cn+1   cn)
a1
1+!
  (1 + ) (rn+1   rn) ;
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Kn, the optimal capacity up to technology n < N , is the unique solution of:
y (Kn; cn; )
1+   y (Kn; cn+1; )
1+
= a1 (1 + ) (rn   rn+1) : (5)
P roof. The proof is presented in the appendix.
The structure of Result 4 is standard in the peak-load pricing literature. The demand and uncer-
tainty specication selected here allows us to derive simple expressions, hence highlight the economic
intuition. The su¢ cient conditions ensure that y (Kn; cn; )  1. They are veried in the numerical
example presented in Section 5. Equation (4) determines the optimal total capacity KN , that depends
only on the marginal and investment costs of the marginal technology N (and of course demand para-
meters and the xed retail price), while equations (5) determine the optimal capacity up to technology
n, that depend only on the marginal and investment costs of technologies n and (n+ 1).
4.2 No rationing conditions
Suppose rationing, if it occurs, is anticipated and proportional. Then:
Result 5 No rationing occurs at the optimum if and only if
  min = a1 [(1 + ) rN ]
1
h
a0 (2cN pR)
2
i1+ : (6)
P roof. No rationing occurs at the optimum as long as price is lower than the V oLL. If rationing is
anticipated and proportional,
v
 
pR; t

=
S
 
pR; t

D (pR; t)
=
a (t) + pR
2
:
Rationing can occur only when all capacity is constrained, i.e., t  bt (KN ; cN ). Algebra presented in
the appendix shows that
v
 
pR; t
  p (t) 8t  bt (KN ; cN ), condition (6)
As expected, rationing no longer occurs as soon as a su¢ cient share of demand is price reactive.
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4.3 Marginal value of Real-Time Pricing
Result 6 Suppose   min. The annual marginal value of Real-Time Pricing is:
W 0 () =
8760
b
0B@ r21
2
+
1
a1 (1 + )
NX
n=1
0B@ (cn+1   cn)

a1 (1 + ) rn   y (Kn; cn; )1+

+y(Kn;cn;)
2+ y(Kn;cn+1;)2+
(1+2)
1CA
1CA :
(7)
P roof. If N = 1,
V ar [p (t)] = V ar [p (t)  c1] = E
h
(p (t)  c1)2
i
  (E [p (t)  c1])2
=
Z +1
bt(K1;c1) (p (t)  c1)
2 f (t) dt  r21:
Then, integrating by parts twice,
Z +1
bt(K1;c1) ( (t)  c1)
2 f (t) dt = 2
Z +1
bt(K1;c1) ( (K1; t)  c1)
@
@t
(1  F (t)) dt
=
2a12

Z +1
bt(K1;c1) ( (K1; t)  c1) e
 (1+2)tdt
= 2
a21
2

e 2bt(K1;c1)2+
(1 + ) (2 + )
= 2
y (K1; c1; )
2+
2a1 (1 + ) (2 + )
:
Thus:
W 0 () = 8760W h0 () =
8760
2b
 
 r21 + 2
y (K1; c1; )
2+
2a1 (1 + ) (2 + )
!
which yields expression (7) for N = 1, since a1 (1 + ) rN   y (KN ; cN ; )1+ = 0 by equation (4),
and y (KN ; cN+1; ) = a1e 2
bt(KN ;cN+1) = a1e 2tN+1 = 0.
For N > 1,
V ar [p (t)] =
NX
n=1
 Z tn
tn
 
cn   pR
2
f (t) dt+
Z tn+1
tn
 
 (Kn; t)  pR
2
f (t) dt
!
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Observing that
 
 (Kn; t)  pR
2
=
 
cn   pR +  (Kn; t)  cn
2
=
 
cn   pR
2
+ 2
 
cn   pR

( (Kn; t)  cn) + ( (Kn; t)  cn)2
yields
V ar [p (t)] =
NX
n=1
0B@ R tntn  cn   pR2 f (t) dt+ R tn+1tn  cn   pR2 f (t) dt
+2
 
cn   pR
 R tn+1
tn
( (Kn; t)  cn) f (t) dt+
R tn+1
tn
( (Kn; t)  cn)2 f (t) dt
1CA
=
NX
n=1
0B@  cn   pR2 R tn+1tn f (t) dt+ 2  cn   pR R tn+1tn ( (Kn; t)  cn) f (t) dt
+
R tn+1
tn
( (Kn; t)  cn)2 f (t) dt
1CA :
Algebra presented in the Appendix shows that integrating the last term by parts twice, then summing
all terms yields expression (7) for N > 1.
5 Application to the French power market
5.1 Demand curve
The demand curve parameters are estimated in two steps: (i) an actual load duration curve, assuming
price is constant, is used to estimate  and derive a rst set of relationships, and (ii) estimates of
price elasticity are then used to derive the last relation among parameters. This approach is that of
Borenstein (2005), Borenstein and Holland (2005), and Holland and Mansur (2006), and is consistent
with the reality of the French power market: in 2009, most customers paid a constant power price,
denoted p0. Observed demand uctuations are due therefore to variations in the states of the world
(a (t) and f (t)). As the share of price reactive demand increases, joint estimation of all parameters
will become possible.
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5.1.1 Estimation of  and rst set of relationships
Denote G (:) the cumulative distribution of demand, i.e., G (x) is the probability that demand is lower
than x. If demand is linear:
G (x) = Pr

a (t)  p0
b
 x

= Pr (a (t)  p0 + bx)
= Pr
 
t  a 1 (x+ bp0)

=
 
F  a 1 (p0 + bx)
Demand measured depends both on the state of the world t and demand conditional on that state
of the world t. Estimating the distribution G (:) allows us to identify F  a 1. F (:) and a (:) cannot
be identied separately.
If a (t) = a0   a1e 2t and f (t) = 1e 1t:
G (x) = 1  exp

1
2
ln
a0   (p0 + bx)
a1

= 1 

a0   (p0 + bx)
a1

Then, 1   G (x) = Pr (load  x) =
h
a0 (x+bp0)
a1
i
can be estimated from an actual load duration
curve.
a0 and a1 cannot be estimated by Maximum Likelihood from the data. The minimum and maxi-
mum admissible values for load must be set exogenously. We choose these values to be the observed
minimum and maximum values for load. Denote  < 1 the ratio of minimum to maximum demand
for price p0 and Q1 = lim
t!+1Q (p0; t) =
a0 p0
b the maximum demand. We have
8><>: a0   bQ
1 = p0
a0   a1   bQ1 = p0
;
which yields 8><>: a1 = bQ
1 (1  )
a0 = p0 + bQ
1
:
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Estimation on 2009 demand in France2 leads to Q1 = 92:4 GW and  = 31:592:4 = 0:34. The
average price paid by customers is p0 = 100 e=MWh. Then, Maximum Likelihood estimation yields
 = 12 = 1:78.
Actual and tted demand are presented on Figure 3.
5.1.2 Estimation of b and all other parameters
Lijesen (2007) provides an up to date survey of the empirical literature on price elasticity of electricity,
as well as his own estimate.
The elasticity of demand  (; t) for a given price  in state t is
 (; t) =   
a (t)   ;
thus
E [ (; t)] =  E


a (t)  

=  
Z +1
0
1e
 1t
a0   a1e 2t    dt:
Setting x = e 1t yields
E [ (; t)] =  
Z 1
0
dx
a0   a1x 1   
=  
Z 1
0
dx
p0 + bQ1   (bQ1 (1  ))x 1   
:
From Lijesen (2007), we select as a base case E [ (; t)] =  0:01 at price  = 100 e=MWh, which
corresponds to the upper estimate from Patrick and Wolak (1997) using UK data, and the lower bound
of Lijesen (2007) own estimate on Dutch data. We also run a robustness check with  =  0:1, which
corresponds to Allcotts (2012) estimate for customers who self-selected into an RTP pilot program.
A higher elasticity of demand renders RTP more attractive.
With these values, for the base case, we have:
8>>>><>>>>:
bQ1 = 18 727 e=MWh
a0 = 18 827 e=MWh
a1 = 12 360 e=MWh
2Source: posted on the French transmission asset owner (RTE) website.
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5.2 Production cost
French electricity is mostly produced from nuclear assets, with gas turbines providing peaking capacity.
As a rst approximation, this article ignores hydraulic assets and other thermal generation units. This
is likely to increase the marginal value of RTP , since including these technologies would likely increase
generation exibility, hence reduce the value of demand exibility.
The International Energy Agency (IEA (2010)) provides the following estimates for the cost of
nuclear assets (n = 1) and gas turbines (n = 2):
1 2
cn 10:99 71:56
rn 34:16 6:00
c2 includes a 25 e/ton carbon price. The marginal value of RTP therefore includes the value of
emissions reduction. r2 is equivalent to 53 e=kW=year, slightly lower than most commonly used
estimates of the annual xed cost of peaking capacity (around 70 e=kW=year). The di¤erence is
attributable mostly to taxes. This is justied as this analysis examines the net total welfare, and
taxes are internal transfers that do not a¤ect it.
5.3 Estimation of the marginal surplus W 0 ()
With the parameters estimated, curtailment of constant price customers does not occur if   min =
3:93% for  =  0:01 and min = 14% for  =  0:1. Figure 4 presents the marginal surplus W 0 () for
the base elasticity  =  0:01 and Figure 5 for the high elasticity  =  0:1, measured in e millions
per year, for   min.
In both cases, W
0
() is decreasing with . For  =  0:01, a 1% increase in the fraction of price
reactive customers increases welfare by e 6:7 millions annually for  = min, and only by e 1:1
millions annually for  = 1. With the selected specication, there are decreasing returns to RTP .
This result is consistent with the economic intuition: the rst percent of demand exibility is highly
valuable, as it dramatically reduces the cost of balancing demand with supply. As a larger share of
demand becomes price responsive, the marginal value of RTP decreases. Further work will determine
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su¢ cient conditions for this result to hold.
W
0
() is slightly higher when demand elasticity increases: for  =  0:1, a 1% increase in the
fraction of price reactive customers increases annual surplus between e 9:4 millions for  = min and
4:7 millions for  = 1. If the price elasticity of demand is higher, customers react more to prices.
Increasing price responsiveness thus has a higher impact.
5.4 Change in production technologies mix
We compare W
0
() for three production technologies mix: (i) a single production technology, Com-
bined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT ), (ii) the previous mix (nuclear and gas turbine), and (iii) a richer
mix, including nuclear, CCGT , and gas turbines. Costs for the CCGT are r = 8 e=MWh and c = 49
e=MWh, also selected from IEA (2010), hence are consistent with the costs of the other technologies.
Figure 6 presents W
0
() for these three technology mixes, and the base elasticity.
Changing the mix has only limited change on the marginal value of price responsiveness. For
example, W
0
(0:5) = 185 millions per year for technology mix (i), 156 millions per year for mix (ii),
and 144 millions per year for mix (iii). Thus, I expect the ndings to apply to other power markets,
where the technology mix is di¤erent.
As observed on Figure 6, W
0
() decreases for any value of  when the number of technologies
increases. This result has a nice intuitive explanation: as the number of technologies increases,
supply exibility increases, hence the marginal value of demand exibility decreases. Unfortunately,
preliminary analysis suggests this result may not always hold. Establishing conditions under which
this result hold in general is left for further research.
5.5 Estimation of the marginal surplus per site
The Commission de Régulation de lEnergie (CRE) provides the total number of sites and the total
consumption (MWh) for four categories of customers3:
1. Large non residential. Around 36 000 sites have peak demand higher than 250 kW : large
industrials, hospitals, shopping malls, large buildings. They represent 0:1% of the total number
of sites, and 42% of total demand
3The segmentation is based on net power (kW ) for large users, and apparent power (kV A) for small users. The
former is slightly smaller than the latter. This does not alter the results.
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2. Medium non residential. Around 360 000 sites have peak-demand between 36 and 250 kW ,
mostly small companies. They represent 1% of the total number of sites, and 15% of total
demand
3. Small non residential. Around 4:6 million sites have peak demand smaller than 36 kV A: pro-
fessional o¢ ces, small workshops. They represent 13% of the total number of sites, 10% of total
demand
4. Residential sites. Around 30:7 million sites, peak demand lower than 36 kV A. They represent
86% of the total number of sites, and only 32% of total demand.
Upon further request4, CRE provided me with the distribution of maximum peak demand for the
30:7 million residential users, presented on Figure 7. The overwhelming majority of residential users
have peak demand of less than 6 kV A (18:1 millions, 59% of residential sites), or 9 kV A (6:5 millions,
21% of residential sites). Under Assumption 1, this peak demand can be translated into in yearly load
in MWh.
Denote  the incremental increase in  from a single site. All sites in each class are assumed to
have the same size, thus  is constant for each class, and given by:
 (%) (0; 42) (42; 57) (57; 67)
 (%=user) 1:18 10 5 4:21 10 7 2:16 10 8
for non-residential customers,
 (%) (67; 67:1) (67:1; 67:2) (67:2; 67:3) (67:3; 69:3) (69:3; 70:1)
Max demand (kV A) 36 30 24 18 15
 (%=user) 5:23 10 8 4:36 10 8 3:49 10 8 2:61 10 8 2:18 10 8
4 I am grateful to Jean-Yves Ollier and Christophe Leininger from CRE for their invaluable help in obtaining these
data.
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for large residential customers (maximum demand higher than 12 kV A), and
 (%) (70:1; 74:7) (74:7; 83:3) (83:3; 99:1) (99:1; 100)
Max demand (kV A) 12 9 6 3
 (%=user) 1:74 10 8 1:31 10 8 8:71 10 9 4:36 10 9
for small residential customers.
W (), the incremental increase in net surplus from one site is estimated as W () =W 0 () .
Since  is discontinuous at the boundaries between users classes, so is W ().
The table below presents W () for non residential sites for  =  0:01:
 (%) min 42 57 67
W (e=user=year) 7 930 2 013 61 3
As expected W () decreases rapidly as sites become smaller.
Figure 8 presents the marginal surplus per site for residential sites, expressed in e per site per
year, for  =  0:01 and Figure 9 for  =  0:1. For the 18 millions residential sites whose peak demand
is lower than 6 kV A, the marginal net surplus from price responsiveness is less than e 1 per year for
 =  0:01, less than 4:3 e per year for  =  0:1. For the 6:5 millions residential users whose peak
demand is lower than 9 kV A, marginal net surplus is less than e 1:7 per year for  =  0:01, less than
6:7 e/year for  =  0:1.
These estimates are in line with Allcott (2012), who, using an elasticity of  =  0:1, nds an
annual welfare gain of $39 per average kW of demand becoming price responsive. Since Allcott (2012)
considers a 20% shift to real time pricing, his value is comparable to the average of W for   20%,
W (0:2) =e 10 263 per site per year. Since the size of these sites is higher than 250 kW , the welfare
gain per kW is lower than e 41 per kW , consistent Allcotts $ 39.
To put these estimates in perspective, they can be compared to the cost of enabling one customer
to switch to real-time pricing. Estimates of the cost of a real time meter (including installation) vary
widely. A median estimate is e 250, higher than in Italy (e 70) and lower than in the UK. Assuming
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a cost of capital at 10%, the annualized cost of each meter is e 25 =meter=year. Furthermore, the
cost of acquiring one customer and to convince him/her to switch pricing structure estimated around
e 50.
5.6 Estimation of the total surplus and total surplus by users class
Finally, equation (7) can be used to estimate the total surplus from switching up to a fraction  of
customers to real time pricing, assuming   min:
W () =
Z 
min
W
0
(x) dx:
Numerical integration shows that W (1) =e 183 millions per year for low elasticity  =  0:01,
and W (1) =e 507 millions per year for  =  0:1.
This number is consistent with other estimates. For example, DECC estimates at £ 6:3 billions the
present value of the energy management benets associated with installing smart gas and electricity
meters. Discounting our value in perpetuity at 6:8%, DECCs e¤ective discount rate, we nd a present
value ranging between e 2 690 and 7 455 millions. Adjusting for the fact that the size of the British
power system is roughly 80% that of France and converting into pounds provides a range between £
1:7 and 4:8 billions for electricity only, not inconsistent with DECCs estimate.
The next table presents the share of the total surplus captured for di¤erent values of  for  =
 0:01:
 (%) 42 57 67 83:3
W ()
W (1) (%) 58 71 78 89
As the previous results have led us to expect, the lions share of the benets is obtained with very
few customers. If the 36 000 large industrial users all become price responsive, 58% of the total
surplus is captured, if all non-residential users become price responsive, 78% of the surplus is captured.
Capturing the remaining 20% of surplus carries a disproportionate share of the costs.
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5.7 Policy implications
This analysis main nding is that the value of price responsiveness lies overwhelmingly with large
customers. I believe this result, mostly driven by the di¤erential in size between large industrial and
small residential users, will prove robust as other specications are tested on data from other countries,
even though the exact values will vary.
This result has three main policy implications. First, it is essential that large customers face real-
time prices, as is the case in most restructured power markets. Ensuring this captures most of the
benets of demand response.
Second, the case for complete rollout of smart meters is weakened. This analysis does not con-
stitute a full-blown marginal cost benet analysis. First, it does not include other benets of "smart
meters", such as reduction in metering costs and other optimization for the distribution network
owner/operator. Second, the cost of installing a meter is the marginal cost of enabling the switch
to real-time price usage, hence the analysis does not include the cost of informing consumers and
inducing them to switch, as well as data storage and processing costs. Nor does it factor in the fact
that, for a variety of reasons, not all consumers equipped with "smart meters" will switch.
When properly accounting for all these, it may be the case that the benets still exceed the costs.
For example, even if we adopt our low estimate for energy management benets (£ 1:7 billions for
electricity alone), the benets still exceed the costs in DECCs analysis. However, it appears that
a large share of the energy management benets can be obtained with a much more limited smart
meters rollout.
Third, the economic case for exposing all residential customers to RTP appears weak. Policy
makers have always been hesitant to do so, for fear that customers nd the exposure to volatility of
spot prices unbearable. The analysis presented here suggest that the economic benet is small, less
than e 4 per customer per year. Thus a voluntary approach may be preferred.
Finally, the above analysis has a commercial implication. Given the small value of price respon-
siveness compared the cost of convincing clients to adopt it, developing a protable residential energy
management o¤er will prove challenging.
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6 Conclusion
The advent of "smart meters" will make possible Real Time Pricing of electricity: customers will
face and react to wholesale spot prices, thus consumption of electric power will be aligned with its
opportunity cost. This article determines the marginal value of a fraction of demand (or a consumer)
switching to Real Time Pricing. First, it derives this marginal value for a simple yet realistic spec-
ication of demand. Second, using data from the French power market, it estimates that, for the
vast majority of residential customers whose peak demand is lower than 6 kV A, the net surplus from
switching to Real Time Pricing is lower than 1 e/year for low demand elasticity, 4 e/year for high
demand elasticity. This nding casts a doubt on the economic value of rolling out smart meters to all
residential customers, for both policy makers and power suppliers.
This analysis will be expanded in at least four directions. First, the methodology will be applied
to other power markets, that present di¤erent shapes of load duration curves, di¤erent distributions
of consumer sizes, and di¤erent generation mix.
Second, the impact of aggregate demand elasticity on the exercise of generatorsmarket power
will be included in the analysis. Allcott (2010) nds a limited impact, but it is worth validating this
nding.
Third, intermittent generation will be included. This will increase the volatility of supply, hence
the value of demand exibility. Quantifying that impact will be extremely important.
Finally, alternative specication of demand will be tested. For example, demand can be assumed
to be log-linear, or constant elasticity, multiple classes of users and intertemporal substitution can
be introduced. This would likely result in closed-form solutions no longer being available. Instead,
numerical analysis will be required.
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A Derivations of the closed-form solutions
A.1 Optimal investment
For n 2 f1; :::; Ng,  (Kn; t) = a(t) bKn (1 )p
R
 , hence:8><>:  (Kn;
tn) =
a(tn) bKn (1 )pR
 = cn
 (Kn; tn+1) =
a(tn+1) bKn (1 )pR
 = cn+1
, 8><>: a0   a1e
 2tn   bKn   (1  ) pR = cn
a0   a1e 2tn+1   bKn   (1  ) pR = cn+1
Adopt the convention tN+1 ! +1. For n 2 f1; :::; Ng, dene
In =
Z tn+1
tn
( (Kn; t)  cn) f (t) dt:
Integrating by parts,
In = [  ( (Kn; t)  cn) (1  F (t))]tn+1tn +
Z tn+1
tn
@
@t
(Kn; t) (1  F (t)) dt
=
h
  ( (Kn; t)  cn) e 1t
itn+1
tn
+
a1

2
Z tn+1
tn
e (1+2)tdt
=   (cn+1   cn) e 1tn+1 + a1

1
1 + 

e (1+2)tn   e (1+2)tn+1

=   (cn+1   cn) y (Kn; cn+1; )
a1

+
y (Kn; cn; )
1+   y (Kn; cn+1; )1+
a1 (1 + )
Determination of fKng1nN proceeds by backwards induction. Start with technology N , the last
technology available. Equation (2) is:
IN = rN :
Since y (KN ; cN+1; )! 0,
IN =
y (KN ; cN ; )
1+
 (1 + ) a1
= rN :
29
Thus, total capacity KN solves:
y (KN ; cN ; )
1+ = a1 (1 + ) rN
,
bKN = a0  
 
cN + (1  ) pR
  a1 (1 + ) rN 11+ :
Suppose now Kn+1 is determined. Then, Kn solves 	(Kn; cn) = rn where
	(Kn; cn) =
Z bt(Kn;cn+1)
bt(Kn;cn) [ (Kn; t)  cn] f (t) dt+
Z +1
bt(Kn;cn+1) [cn+1   cn] f (t) dt+	(Kn+1; cn+1)
= In + (cn+1   cn) e 1tn+1 +	(Kn+1; cn+1)
=
y (Kn; cn; )
1+   y (Kn; cn+1; )1+
a1 (1 + )
+ rn+1:
Thus, if
y (Kn+1; cn; )
1+   y (Kn+1; cn+1; )1+
a1 (1 + )
 rn+1   rn;
Kn  Kn+1 is uniquely dened by:
y (Kn; cn; )
1+   y (Kn; cn+1; )1+ = a1 (1 + ) (rn   rn+1) :
A.2 No rationing condition
No rationing occurs at the optimum as long as the V oLL exceeds than price faced by price reactive
load. If rationing is proportional and anticipated:
v (p; ; t) =
S (p; t)
D (p; t)
=
a (t) + p
2
:
No rationing occurs at the optimum if and only if, for all t  0:
a (t) + pR
2
 p (t) :
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Given the structure of the price, this is equivalent to:
a (t) + pR
2
  (KN ; t) 8t  tn+1
,
a (t) + pR
2
 a (t)  bKN   (1  ) p
R

8t  tn+1
,
bKN  (2  ) a (t)  p
R
2
8t  tn+1
,
bKN  (2  ) a0   p
R
2
:
Substituting in the expression of KN , this is equivalent to:
a0   a1

rN
a1
(1 + )
 1
1+
   cN + (1  ) pR  (2  ) a0   pR
2
,
  min = a1 [(1 + ) rN ]
1
h
a0 (2cN pR)
2
i 1+

:
A.3 Marginal value of  for N  2
W 0 () = 12bE
h 
pR   p (t)2i = 8760b LN , where LN = V ar[p(t)]2 . Then:
V ar [p (t)] = 2LN =
NX
n=1
 
cn   pR
2 Z tn+1
tn
f (t) dt+ 2
 
cn   pR

In +
Z tn+1
tn
( (Kn; t)  cn)2 f (t) dt

:
Integrating by parts twice,
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Hn =
Z tn+1
tn
( (Kn; t)  cn)2 f (t) dt
=
h
  ( (Kn; t)  cn)2 (1  F (t))
itn+1
tn
+ 22
a1

Z tn+1
tn
( (Kn; t)  cn) e (1+2)tdt
=   (cn+1   cn)2 e 1tn+1 + 2
1 + 
a1

0B@   ( (Kn; t)  cn) e (1+2)ttn+1tn
+a12
R tn+1
tn
e (1+22)tdt
1CA
=   (cn+1   cn)2 e 1tn+1   2a1

(cn+1   cn) e
 (1+2)tn+1
1 + 
+ 2
a1

2 e (1+22)tn   e (1+22)tn+1
(1 + ) (1 + 2)
=   (cn+1   cn)2 e 1tn+1   2 (cn+1   cn) y (Kn; cn+1; )
1+
a1 (1 + )
+ 2
y (Kn; cn; )
2+   y (Kn; cn+1; )2+
2a1 (1 + ) (1 + 2)
:
Then,
S1 =
NX
n=1
 
cn   pR
2 Z tn+1
tn
f (t) dt =
NX
n=1
 
cn   pR
2 
e 1tn   e 1tn+1

=
NX
n=1
e 1tn+1
h 
cn+1   pR
2    cn   pR2i+  c1   pR2 e 1t1    cN+1   pR2 e 1tN+1
=
NX
n=1
e 1tn+1 (cn+1   cn)
 
cn+1 + cn   2pR

+ r21:
Hence,
2LN =
N 1X
n=1
8>>>><>>>>:
e 1tn+1 (cn+1   cn)
 
cn+1 + cn   2pR

+2
 
cn   pR
    (cn+1   cn) e 1tn+1 + (rn   rn+1)
  (cn+1   cn)2 e 1tn+1   2 (cn+1   cn) y(Kn;cn+1;)
1+
a1 (1+)
+ 2y(Kn;cn;)
2+ y(Kn;cn+1;)2+
2a1 (1+)(1+2)
9>>>>=>>>>;
+r21 + 2
 
cN   pR

rN + 2
y (KN ; cN ; )
2+
2a1 (1 + ) (1 + 2)
= 2
 
N 1X
n=1
 
cn   pR

(rn   rn+1) +
 
cN   pR

rN   (cn+1   cn) y (Kn; cn+1; )
1+
a1 (1 + )
!
+2
NX
n=1
y (Kn; cn; )
2+   y (Kn; cn+1; )2+
2a1 (1 + ) (1 + 2)
+
r21
2
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Since pR = c1 + r1,
S2 =
N 1X
n=1
 
cn   pR

(rn   rn+1) +
 
cN   pR

rN =
NX
n=1
 
cn   pR

rn  
N 1X
n=1
 
cn   pR

rn+1
=
N 1X
n=1
rn+1 (cn+1   cn)  r21:
Thus,
LN =
N 1X
n=1
(cn+1   cn)
 
rn+1   y (Kn; cn+1; )
1+
a1 (1 + )
!
+
NX
n=1
y (Kn; cn; )
2+   y (Kn; cn+1; )2+
2a1 (1 + ) (1 + 2)
  r
2
1
2
=
NX
n=1
 
(cn+1   cn)
 
rn   y (Kn; cn; )
1+
a1 (1 + )
!
+
y (Kn; cn; )
2+   y (Kn; cn+1; )2+
2a1 (1 + ) (1 + 2)
!
  r
2
1
2
=  r
2
1
2
+
1
a1 (1 + )
NX
n=1
0B@ (cn+1   cn)

a1 (1 + ) rn   y (Kn; cn; )1+

+y(Kn;cn;)
2+ y(Kn;cn+1;)2+
(1+2)
1CA :
Consider now the units. Equation (7) can be rewritten as W 0 () = 8760Q1 LNbQ1 , where LN =
V ar[p(t)]
2 . LN is expressed in e
2  MWh 2, which is denoted as [LN ] =e2  MWh 2. Thenh
8760Q1 LNbQ1
i
= 103e=year, since [Q1] = GW , [bQ1] =e=MWh, and [8760] = h=year. Finally,h
W 0 () = 8:76Q1 LNbQ1
i
=e millions=year.
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Figure	  1:	  Characteriza0on	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Figure	  2:	  Welfare	  increase	  
Figure	  3:	  Actual	  and	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Figure	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Figure	  5:	  marginal	  surplus	  from	  price	  responsiveness,	  high	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Figure	  6:	  marginal	  surplus	  from	  price	  responsiveness,	  mul0ple	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Figure	  7:	  Distribu0on	  of	  residen0al	  consumers	  by	  size	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Figure	  8:	  marginal	  surplus	  per	  residen0al	  consumer,	  base	  
elas0city	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Figure	  9:	  marginal	  surplus	  per	  residen0al	  consumer,	  high	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